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Blinding Laser Weapons and Protocol
IV: Obscuring the Humanitarian
Vision
I. Introduction
Blinding as a method of warfare is not new to the conduct of
armed conflict.1 It is the fast approaching reality of cheap, mass
produced, low energy laser2 weapons, capable of causing permanent
blindness and their potential for widespread use, that has brought
renewed international attention.3
The international community has long recognized the necessity
of placing humanitarian limitations on both the methods and means
of warfare.4 Those military measures whose necessity, or utility,
are disproportionate to the human suffering they engender are
prohibited under both customary and codified international
humanitarian law.5
The recent Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
1. After the battle of Balathista, Basil II, the Eastern Emperor of the
Byzantine empire, blinded ninety-nine percent of all the Bulgarian soldiers he
captured, with one percent allowed to retain vision in one eye in order that they
might lead the others home. 1 LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 11 (1972).
2. Laser is an acronym for light amplification by the stimulated emission of
radiation. JEFF HECHT, BEAM WEAPONS: THE NExT ARMS RACE 23 (1984).
This Comment will not address high-energy laser systems which, although they
may have incidental anti-personnel effects, are not intended for anti-personnel use.
3. As recently as 1973, experts believed that the use of lasers as anti-
personnel devices would be unlikely due to the low cost effectiveness for the
purpose. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS: WEAPONS THAT
MAY CAUSE UNNECESSARY SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS:
REPORT ON THE WORK OF EXPERTS 69 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 ICRC REPORT].
4. In any armed conflict "the right of the parties to choose methods or means
of warfare is not unlimited." PROTOCOL I ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 35(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3-608 [hereinafter
1977 PROTOCOL I].
5. FRrrs KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON WAGING OF WAR 29-30 (1987).
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Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (hereinafter Weapons
Convention),6 adopted an Additional Protocol on Blinding Laser
Weapons to be annexed to the Weapons Convention as Protocol
IV.7 Protocol IV was adopted with the intention of limiting the
use of blinding laser weapons in light of existing international
humanitarian limitations and their effect on the conduct of war.
This Comment will examine humanitarian limitations on the
conduct of warfare and the problem that blinding laser weapons
present. Specifically, Part II will provide an overview of lasers,
with emphasis on current military applications of the laser and their
effects on the eye. Part III will address the relevant customary and
codified international law applicable to armed conflict and laser
weapons. Part IV analyzes the recent Protocol IV annexed to the
Weapons Convention, addressing in particular its deficiencies.
Finally, Part V concludes that although Protocol IV is a positive
attempt at eliminating an excessively injurious weapon, it falls well
short of meeting expectations.
II. Lasers and Their Effects on the Eye
The beam of a laser is a very intense stream of similar
electromagnetic wavelengths.8 Lasers emit radiation with wave-
lengths in the optical radiation portion of the electromagnetic
6. The Review Conference was held from September 25 to October 13, 1995
in Vienna. UNITED NATIONS, REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO
THE CONVENTION ON PROHIBITION OR RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF CERTAIN
CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY
INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS, PROTOCOL ON BLINDING
LASER WEAPONS, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.I/7 (1995) [hereinafter PROTOCOL IV].
A review conference may be convened at the request of a State Party to "review
the scope and operation of this Convention and the Protocols annexed thereto."
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional
Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, art. 8, para. 3(a), S. TREATY DOC. No. 25,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter Weapons Convention].
A review conference may also consider and decide upon the annexation of
additional protocols to the Convention. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 151.
7. PROTOCOL IV, supra note 6.
8. Whenever a charged particle loses energy in an electric field, electromag-
netic radiation is emitted, which is characterized by its wavelength. MAJOR
GENERAL BENGT ANDERBERG & DR. MYRON L. WOLBARSHT, LASER
WEAPONS: THE DAWN OF A NEW MILITARY AGE 16 (1992).
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spectrum,9 which includes ultraviolet, visible, and infrared wave-
lengths.1"
The eye functions as a complex optical system, capable of
both detecting and focusing certain wavelengths of electromagnetic
radiation on to the retina." When light radiation enters the eye,
it passes through the ocular media, 2 which serves to focus the
light on to the retina at the rear of the eye. 3 Although the retina
itself is not much more sensitive to damage from lasers than other
parts of the body, the ocular media renders it particularly suscepti-
ble because it magnifies the intensity of the laser beam by a factor
of approximately 100,000 times.14
Not all wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation are transmit-
ted to the retina, however; only visible and near-infrared radiation
are transmitted." Visible electromagnetic radiation comprises a
very narrow part of the entire spectrum, and generally has a
wavelength between 400 nanometers and 700 nanometers.1 6 Near-
infrared radiation generally has a wavelength between 700 and 1400
nanometers and is invisible to the eye.17 It is only electromagnetic
radiation within this wavelength range, 400 to 1400 nanometers,
that the ocular media focuses on the retina. This range is known
as the "retinal hazard region."' 9
A. The Effect
The effect of a laser on the eye is a function of many variables,
such as distance from the laser source, characteristics of the beam,
9. The electromagnetic spectrum ranges from very long, low frequency
wavelengths such as commercial power, to extremely short, high frequency
wavelengths such as gamma rays. Id. at 14.
10. Id. at 15.
11. Id. at 67.
12. The ocular media consists of the cornea, the aqueous fluid in the anterior
chamber, the lens, and the vitreous. LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, BLINDING WEAPONS: REPORTS OF THE
MEETINGS OF EXPERTS CONVENED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITrEE OF THE
RED CROSS ON BAT tLEFIELD LASER WEAPONS (1989-1991) 148 (1993).
13. The retina is actually an extension of the brain, comprised of complex
layers of nerve cells. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 68.
14. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 74-75. If a pair of 7 x 50
binoculars were being used at the time, the intensity of the energy would be 25
times greater still. Id. at 74.
15. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 151.
16. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 70.
17. Id. at 70.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 73.
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and atmospheric conditions.2' The least destructive effects would
be temporary states of discomfort known as "dazzle" and "flash
blindness."21 Dazzle occurs when retinal receptors are overloaded
by intense light and visual function is severely depressed.22 Flash
blindness is similar to dazzle, and occurs when photoreceptors are
exposed to a bright flash of light and the photopigments are
bleached.23
Only lasers operating in the visible spectrum are capable of
inducing dazzle or flash blindness. 24  Both can occur without
causing any permanent damage if the eyes have been adjusted to
the dark before being exposed to a laser beam at night and the
energy level of the laser is low.' It is not possible, however, to
flash blind a person during the daytime without also causing
permanent damage.26 The threshold between flash blindness and
permanent blinding is very narrow, since the level of energy
necessary to flash blind a person is very close to the level necessary
to cause permanent damage.27
The more severe effects on the eye take the form of either
photodisruption or photocoagulation. 2  Photodisruption occurs
when laser energy focused within the eye is so intense that it turns
living tissue in the eye to a plasma.29 When the electromagnetic
field is no longer present, the plasma becomes a gaseous product,
leaving a void in the eye.31 The gaseous product forms a cavita-
tion bubble which eventually collapses in an often violent man-
ner.
31
When a laser's energy is transferred to the eye tissues at a
faster rate than can safely be dissipated, the resultant thermal effect
20. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 145.
21. Id. at 121.
22. Id. The effect is similar to that of bright car head lights on a driver's
vision at night. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 145.
23. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 122. The process of restoring bleached
pigment takes several minutes and the exposed area of the retina will be
functionally blind until the process is completed. Id. A mild form of flash
blindness would be comparable to the after-images which result from staring at a
light bulb or a photographer's flash. Id.
24. Id.
25. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 155.
26. Id. This is due partly to the fact that more light is needed to produce flash
blindness in the daytime because the pupil is constricted. Id.
27. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 25.





is known as photocoagulation.32 The increase in temperature
produces an effect in eye tissue similar to what boiling an egg does
to the egg white.33 Lesions are produced, which will disrupt vision
to an extent dependent upon their size and location within the
eye.34 Damage to the eye from photocoagulation can occur within
micro-seconds.
3 5
The danger of hemorrhaging, with blood seeping forward into
the retina or vitreous, is possible with both photodisruption and
photocoagulation.36 Damage to the cornea or lens is also possible
depending on the wavelength of the laser.37 This type of damage
produces image distortion, haze, and blurring of vision which can
often be repaired if sophisticated medical attention is immediately
available.3"
Damage to the retina, although painless, is irreparable and
permanent.3 9 Unless there is severe hemorrhaging, damage to the
periphery of the retina will usually lead to only slight visual
impairment.' Damage to the central area of the retina causes
instantaneous loss of central vision and legal blindness."1
B. The Military Applications of Low-Energy Lasers
It is necessary to draw a distinction between current laser
systems used in conjunction with other conventional weapons and
those that are intended solely as weapons.42 Designed to assist
conventional weapon systems in their effectiveness, both the laser
rangefinder and target designator are highly effective in reducing
the incidence of collateral damage due to the increased accuracy
that they provide.43 As a result, there are fewer indiscriminate
civilian casualties since military targets can be pinpointed and
32. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 77.
33. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 122.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id. at 123-124.
37. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 149.




42. ANN PETERS, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH ARMS PROJECT, REPORT ON
BLINDING LASER WEAPONS: THE NEED TO BAN A CRUEL AND INHUMANE
WEAPON 21 (1995).
43. Id. at 21. Laser rangefinders and target designators are non-weapons
which assist conventional weapons by determining distances to and pinpointing
targets with great accuracy. Id.
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attacked with minimal or no damage to civilian centers.44 The
Human Rights Watch Arms Project does not oppose the legitimate
use of laser rangefinders and designators because they enable more
precise deployment of weapons.
45
Modem rangefinders and designators are not eye-safe,46
however; both employ lasers with output wavelengths well within
the retinal hazard region.47 There are eye-safe lasers with output
wavelengths outside the retinal hazard region that could find use;
however, at this time no laser matches the practical utility of the
type already employed.'
1. Laser Systems Intended as Weapons. -Low-energy laser
weapons utilizing the laser beam as the "primary kill mecha-
nism ',49 have been developed with the potential for immediate
production and military application.5' Low energy lasers are
effective as weapons only against the eye and similarly sensitive
sensors." The optics of sensors, like eyes, are particularly sensi-
tive to laser light because it is their function to magnify incoming
electromagnetic radiation. 2 Although it is always the target in
question53 that determines the necessary properties of the laser to
be employed, the demarcations between the intended functions of
anti-sensor and anti-personnel weapons are somewhat blurred
44. Steve Pagani, U.N. Conference Urged to Ban Blinding Lasers, REUTERS,
Oct. 4, 1995.
45. USA Bans 'Blinding' Lasers, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Oct. 7, 1995, at
5.
46. Several gunners and tank men were accidentally blinded by the beams
from laser rangefinders in the Persian Gulf War. Thou Shalt Not Blind, THE
ECONOMIST, Oct. 14, 1994, at 54.
47. The retinal hazard region is comprised of electromagnetic radiation within
the range of only 400 to 1400 nanometers. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra
note 8, at 70.
48. Id. at 46.
49. PETERS, supra note 42, at 121.
50. Id.
51. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 94.
52. Id.
53. When determining the target in question it must be remembered that only
in cases of electro-optical devices where there is a physical separation between the
sensor and the eye, such as viewing a monitor, would the low energy laser not be
attacking the eye of the combatant. WILLIAM M. ARKIN, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH ARMS PROJECT, REPORT ON UNITED STATES BLINDING LASER
WEAPONS 5 (1995).
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because both operate within the retinal hazard region of the
electromagnetic spectrum. 4
a. Anti-sensor laser weapons.-Anti-sensor laser
weapons55 are designed to destroy, or render temporarily inopera-
ble, the optical or electro-optical viewing systems of the oppo-
nent.16 The modern battlefield has become dependent upon the
visual enhancement that optical and electro-optical sensors provide
their users.57
Optical devices such as binoculars and gunsights have been in
service for a long time and typically serve to magnify an image
through various lenses. Electro-optical devices are somewhat more
complex because they provide their operator with enhanced
fighting capabilities, such as the ability to see through smoke or fog
or to fight effectively at night.5 8 One such device is a thermal
viewing system, which employs sensors capable of detecting subtle
differences in temperature, and then provides the operator with an
enhanced thermal picture. 9 Another device is the image intensifi-
er. Due to its extreme sensitivity to light, it is capable of intensify-
ing very small amounts of visible light and producing an enhanced
image on a viewing screen for the operator.'
Sensors are easily made ineffective by laser weapons.61 At
the upper end of its power range, the low-energy laser is capable
of "crazing" the glass lenses of an optical or electro-optical
device.62 Crazing occurs when the thermal effect of the laser's
energy causes the glass to heat and crack, with a frosted effect as
a result, making it impossible to see through the glass.6
At lower energy levels, if the laser's wavelength is one which
the electro-optical device's sensor is designed to receive and
enhance, the laser energy will be magnified, and consequently,
54. Id. at 93. Unless there is some separation of the eye from the sensor, the
eye will always be the true target and the optic will serve only to intensify the
beam before it enters the eye. ARKIN, supra note 53, at 5.
55. Anti-sensor laser weapons may also properly be called optical and electro-
optical countermeasure systems. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at
148.
56. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 97.
57. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 146.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 147.
60. Id.
61. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 108.
62. Id. at 148.
63. Id. This effect can be accomplished in less time than it takes to blink an
eye. Id.
19961
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destroying extremely sensitive radiation detectors and rendering the
device inoperable.' Similarly, if the wavelength is one which the
eye is capable of transmitting, then an optical device will magnify
and intensify the image even before the beam reaches the ocular
media.
The Stingray Combat Protection System (hereinafter Stingray)
is an American anti-sensor weapon.65 The Stingray scans the
battlefield for sensors with a low-power near-infrared laser.' If
the beam encounters a sensor, a small fraction of the laser pulse is
reflected back to the Stingray which instantaneously locks onto the
sensor and increases the level of laser energy, overloading or
jamming the sensor.67 The Stingray is a large system, mounted
onto a platform such as a Bradley Fighting Vehicle.' TWo
operational prototypes were deployed during the Persian Gulf War
but were not used due to the short duration of the conflict.69
b. Anti-personnel laser weapons. -Anti-personnel laser
weapons are designed with the sole intended function of disabling
the opponent's vision by attacking the eyes.7' Distinguishing
between anti-personnel and anti-sensor weapons becomes quite
problematic as both can employ lasers with similar wavelengths
capable of damaging both battlefield sensors and eyes. 71 Howev-
er, the intended function of the laser weapon will influence its
design and production so that it will perform as optimally as
intended.
The British Royal Navy has deployed a ship-based anti-
personnel laser weapon, the Laser Dazzle Sight (hereinafter LDS),
since the early 1980s. 72 The laser weapon is intended to produce
a dazzle effect on the cockpit of enemy warplanes, temporarily
flash blinding the pilots. 73 The LDS was used by British warships
during the Falklands campaign to disturb the vision of attacking
aircraft pilots.74 The British Minister for Defense Procurement
has since stated that British armed forces do not currently possess
64. Id.
65. ARKIN, supra note 53, at 11.
66. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 107.
67. Id. at 107.
68. ARKIN, supra note 53, at 11.
69. Id. at 12.
70. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 97.
71. Id.
72. ARKIN, supra note 53, at 14.
73. Id.
74. PETERS, supra note 42, at 20.
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any laser weapon "designed permanently to blind enemy troops or
to disrupt their eyesight temporarily."75
The Laser Countermeasure System (hereinafter LCMS) was
developed for the United States Army primarily to "detect, jam,
and suppress threat fire control, optical, and electro-optical
subsystems. 7 6 The LCMS is a laser system mounted onto an M-
16 rifle which is to be "employed by the individual soldier to find
and disrupt threat optical and electro-optical surveillance devic-
es."'77 Although seemingly an anti-sensor weapon, the LCMS is
actually a dual purpose weapon, capable of serving in an anti-
personnel capacity.7" According to the Army, once the target is
acquired, one of the intended functions of the LCMS would be to
"negate the capabilities of threat electro-optical device or impair
the vision of an OED operator.,79 The LCMS at maximum ranges
is capable of dazzling, and at a range of 1,000 meters or less, can
cause permanent blindness to anyone employing an optical device
such as binoculars.80
Unlike other countries with laser weapon capabilities, China
makes no pretenses about the intended purposes of its ZM-87
Portable Laser Disturber.8 1 Displayed recently at a weapons show
in Manila, its manufacturer claims that one of the weapon's primary
functions is to "injure or dizzy the eyes of an enemy combatant.
82
75. David Fairhall, Britain Halts Work on Laser Weapons, THE GUARDIAN,
May 23, 1995, at 5.
76. Lockheed Sanders Fact Sheet, Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS)
AN/PLQ-5 (1994) (quoted in ARKIN, supra note 53, at 8).
77. U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate Fact Sheet,
"Laser Countermeasure System," (obtained April 1995 under Freedom of
Information Act) (quoted in ARKIN, supra note 53, at 8).
78. This is true, even though the Director of Strategic and Tactical System
stated that "U.S. laser weapons and, specifically the Laser Countermeasure
System, are designed to produce optical and electro-optical disruption and are
neither designed nor intended to produce permanent vision impairment in people."
Letter from George R. Schnieter, Director, Strategic and Tactical Systems, Office
of the Under Secretary of Defense, to Human Rights Watch (June 9, 1995)
(quoted in PETERS, supra note 42, at 8 n.32).
79. Department of the Army, Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Memorandum, Subject: AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasure System; Law of War
Review, (Sept. 16, 1994) (quoted in ARKIN, supra note 53, at 8) (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Bradley Graham, Pentagon Shifts, Seeks Laser Weapons Curbs, WASH.
POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at A3.
82. ZM-87 Portable Laser Disturber Fact Sheet, China North Industries Corp,
(obtained 1995) (quoted in PETERS, supra note 53, at 11). The ZM-87 is capable
of injuring the human eye at a distance of two to three kilometers and if a
magnifying optic is employed the distance would be increased to five kilometers.
Id. In addition, its capability for producing flash blindness is effective to ten
1996]
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There are no complete defensive measures to low energy, anti-
personnel laser weapons. The optimal anti-personnel laser would
employ wavelengths within that part of the spectrum which the eye
transmits, since the energy required would be low."3 To achieve
maximum psychological impact, an invisible laser operating outside
the visible spectrum would be employed.' The weapon would be
capable of producing lasers with multiple wavelengths in order to
make protection near impossible.'
There are goggles which provide wavelength specific protection
from lasers, but they are effective only in blocking known lasers of
a certain wavelength. 6 Laser weapons capable of emitting lasers
of several different wavelengths render complete protection
impossible unless all of the threat wavelengths are known." One
possibility for protection, according to the U.S. Air Force, is to
wear an opaque patch over one eye, so the wearer would retain the
visual capability of one eye at least.'
III. International Law of Armed Conflict
International law regulates the means, methods, and weaponry
of war in an attempt at preserving humanity in recognition of the
ever present reality of war.89 The law of armed conflict comprises
both the customary, or generally recognized principles and rules of
international law, and those rules codified in international agree-
ments.9°
Even though citizens take up arms for their state, they "do not
cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one
another and to God." 91 Worldwide peace has proven elusive.
Therefore, the necessity for rules of conduct, intended to regulate
the actions of combatants during the inevitable waging of war,
kilometers. Id. The ZM-87 transmits two laser pulses at different wavelengths,
making defensive procedures less effective. Michael Dynes, Red Cross Calls for
a World Ban on Blinding Laser Guns, THE TIMES, Sept. 8, 1995.
83. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 149.
84. Id. at 149.
85. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 130.
86. Id. at 141.
87. Id. Tunable lasers can emit beams of any wavelength and an effective
filter would allow no visible transmission at all, thereby rendering it useless. Id.
88. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 130.
89. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 159.
90. 1977 PROTOCOL I, art.2(b), supra note 4.
91. Francis Lieber, Instructions For the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, art. XV, [hereinafter Lieber Code], in FRIEDMAN, supra note
1, at 158.
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remains paramount. 2  The regulation of armed conflict stems
from the humanitarian belief that the "progress of civilization
should have the effect of alleviating, as much as possible, the
calamities of war."'93
A. The Seeming Paradox of the Law of Armed Conflict
International law governing the waging of war is prima facie
paradoxical, but the extent of the paradox depends on which view
of the nature of man that one has. For Thomas Hobbes, the
common nature of man served only to foster a war of all against
all, a state of mere survival.94 Existence was "nasty, poor, brutish,
and short."95 Legal order served to extricate man from this state
of constant war and act as an artificial restraint to protect him from
that which was his very nature. Laws governing the conduct of war
then appear highly paradoxical, for armed conflict can only
represent the ultimate breakdown of legal restraints.96
Conversely, if man is by nature a social creature, then a
condition of violence is not natural but a "divergence from a more
co-operative norm."'97 Armed conflict is therefore, a direct affront
to society's normal state of peace.9" The laws of armed conflict
then represent a reality-based measure which recognizes the
inevitability of both the outbreak of war and more importantly, its
ultimate resolution. Recognition of the inevitable resolution of
conflict and a return to the traditional legal order necessitates that
conduct during a conflict be regulated. For Hilaire McCoubrey,99
this recognition requires an awareness that the "greater the degree
of barbarity manifested in the conduct of military operations, the
92. JEAN PICrET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW 79 (1985). There have been only 250 years of general peace
in the past 3,400 years, and on average over the past 5,000 years one million
persons have been killed per year. Id.
93. Declaration Renouncing the Use in War of Certain Explosive Projectiles,
Dec. 11, 1868, Preamble, 138 Consol. T.S. 297 [hereinafter St. Petersburg
Declaration].
94. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962).
95. Id.
96. HILAIRE MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE
REGULATION OF ARMED CONFLICT 2 (1990).
97. Id. at 3.
98. PICrET, supra note 92, at 63. The Lieber Code states that "Peace is their
normal condition; War is the exception." Lieber Code, supra note 91, art.
XXVIII.
99. Mr. McCoubrey is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Nottingham, and
a renowned scholar in the field of international humanitarian law.
1996]
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more difficult the.., process of normalization of relations is likely
to be." 1" The laws of armed conflict recognize war as an unnatu-
ral and temporary state of relations after which there must be
reconciliation between the parties."' To this end, they emphasize
that humanitarian principles must govern and serve to restrain the
conduct of the parties during a conflict.
B. The Methods or Means of Warfare Are Not Unlimited
Jean Pictet'0 2 states that humanitarian concerns have served
as inspiration for the "Principle of the Law of War." He defines
the Principle as follows: "the right of the parties to the conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited."' 03 This
principle of limitation has served as a foundation for the develop-
ment of the international humanitarian law of armed conflict.1°4
Undeniably predicated upon humanitarian concerns, the law
of the Hague has historically concerned itself with regulating the
means and methods of conducting warfare. To this end, Article 22
of the Hague Regulations states that the "right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.""1 5  This
principle is now regarded as customary international law.1
6
C. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality demands a balancing of the
necessities of war and the principles of humanitarian law."l It
100. MCCOUBREY, supra note 96, at 3, 4.
101. St. Augustine wrote that "[p]eace should be the object of your desire; war
should be waged only as a necessity, and waged only that God may by it deliver
men from the necessity and preserve them in peace." FRIEDMAN, supra note 1,
at 7.
102. Jean Pictet has a long history of involvement in the field of international
humanitarian law notably, serving as Director of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), and from 1974 to 1977 as head of the ICRC delegation to
the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of Internation-
al Humanitarian Law applicable in Armed Conflicts. PICTET, supra note 92, at
VII. The author is also recognized as having first proposed the term 'humanitarian
law', which has found widespread acceptance and application since. Id. at 1.
103. Id. at 63.
104. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 29.
105. Convention II Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, entered
into force Sept. 4, 1900, section II, ch. 1, art. XXII, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter 1899
Hague Convention II].
106. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 18.
107. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration stated it as the need "to reconcile the
necessities of war with the laws of humanity." 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration,
supra note 93.
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requires that those military measures which are disproportionate to
the human suffering they cause be prohibited." s  Although
military necessity and humanitarian laws have historically been
viewed as being fundamentally opposite,'O° the two can be recon-
ciled."' Not only can there be, but there must be, for the con-
duct of armed conflict must comport with the demands of humani-
tarian law."'
1. Military Necessity and Laser Weapons-It must not be
forgotten, that the object of war is to so incapacitate the enemy's
armed forces that they concede."2 The Lieber Code,"' provid-
ed that the object of war could not serve to justify all means and
limited military necessity to only those measures "which are
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful
according to the modern law and usages of war.""' 4 Some courses
of action are of ultimate necessity for securing military advantage,
while others represent varying gradations on a scale of military
necessity."5 For some, military necessity "is nothing other than
the claim that certain things are allowed in armed conflict; on no
other ground than that they must be done.""' 6 Determining
which measures are indispensable and which are merely expedient
is often problematic."7
Implicit in a determination of military necessity, for purposes
of imposing limitations on weapons, is an analysis of the military
108. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 204.
109. PICTET, supra note 94, at 62.
110. William G. Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 AM. J.
INT'L L. 251 (1953).
111. PICTET, supra note 92, at 62.
112. The St. Petersburg Declaration declared that "the only legitimate object
which states should endeavor to accomplish during war is to weaken the military
force of the enemy ... ." St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 93.
113. Lieber Code, supra note 91. Francis Lieber drafted a code of regulations
"as authorized by the laws and usages of war" for a government commissioned
board which was subsequently promulgated in 1863 as General's Orders No.100,
entitled "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field." FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at xvii.
114. Lieber Code, supra note 93, art. XIV.
115. At the root of the difficulty lies the uncertainty as to what exactly military
necessity implies. INGRID D. DELUPIS, THE LAW OF WAR 335 (1987).
116. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 160. The opposing claim is "that even in
armed conflict certain things are not allowed, because they amount to an
intolerable encroachment of humanity." Id.
117. DELUPIS, supra note 115, at 332. A State engaged in an armed conflict
will do its utmost to win but, this objective may be more easily attainable if the
State resorts to inhumane warfare. Id. at 333.
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utility in employing such weapons.'18 In reality, where there have
been successful prohibitions or limitations of a weapon, the weapon
did not possess any real military utility."9  F o 11 ow i n g t h e
announcement of a new Department of Defense policy on blinding
lasers,'20 a review of the Department's laser programs was con-
ducted.12 1  As a result of this review, the LCMS program was
promptly terminated."2 Even though the Army had claimed the
LCMS was an anti-sensor weapon, one official involved in the
decision to terminate the program was quoted as saying:
But what's the purpose of temporarily messing up a sensor on,
say, an enemy tank when you still have the tank coming at you
and you have other ways of eliminating it? For the laser to be
effective, it would have to be used to blind the opposition. But
trying to blind temporarily is very hard, and trying to blind
permanently is not our policy."3
Senior Pentagon civilians had concluded that the LCMS had little
military utility and although not violative of the new policy, was not
in keeping with its spirit. 4
2. Unnecessary Suffering.-It is axiomatic that combatants
are permitted under the laws of armed conflict to employ weapons
capable of killing other combatants. However, combatants are not
permitted "to use methods or means of warfare exclusively
designed to injure soldiers with the injurious effects lasting, not
118. Although one pound of botulism toxin would theoretically be sufficient to
exterminate the population of the earth, because there are too many unknown
factors that would accompany its use, the military utility of this weapon is
negligible at best. PICrET, supra note 92, at 55.
119. JULIUS STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, 551 n.23
(1973). Stone writes that "rules that grow up are rules touching the old and more
marginal weapons, not weapons which by their novelty and efficiency are more
likely to be decisive." Id. at 551.
120. The new policy "prohibits the use of lasers specifically designed to cause
permanent blindness of unenhanced vision," while recognizing that "accidental or
incidental eye injuries may occur on the battlefield as the result of the use of
legitimate laser systems." News Release, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense,
Department Of Defense Announces Policy on Blinding Lasers, Sept. 1, 1995, in
PETERS, supra note 42, at 48.
121. Memorandum for Secretary of the Army, Subject: Termination of the
Laser Countermeasure System (LCMS), Oct. 5, 1995. A day before the new policy
was announced, the Army contracted with Lockheed Sanders to produce seventy-
five LCMS units at a cost of $16.8 million. Graham, supra note 81, at A3.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Bradley Graham, Army Laser Weapon Becomes First Casualty of New
Policy, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1995, at A4.
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only for the duration of the conflict, but for the rest of their
lives.""l
The goal of waging war is to render the opposing combatants
"hors de combat"1" but humanitarian law requires that a combat-
ant be rendered hors de combat for the duration of the conflict
only.27 This comports with the theory that for a combatant to be
taken out of action: (1) he should not be injured if he can be made
a prisoner; (2) he should not be killed if he can be injured; and, (3)
if light injury is sufficient, then grave injury should be avoided."
Considering the nature of war, this theory may seem paradoxi-
cal,129 but to retain as much humanity as possible throughout the
conduct of hostilities requires that it be permissible to use only as
much force as necessary to render a combatant hors de combat for
the duration of the conflict, and no more.
a. The St. Petersburg Declaration. -The principle of
customary international law prohibiting the use of weapons which
cause unnecessary suffering first found expression in the 1868 St.
Petersburg Declaration.13° Gathering in St. Petersburg, 3 ' an
125. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 211.
126. A person is hors de combat if:
(a) he is in the power of an adverse Party;
(b) he clearly expresses an intention to surrender; or
(c) he has been rendered unconscious or is otherwise incapacitated by
wounds or sickness and, therefore, is incapable of defending himself; provided that
in any of these cases he abstains from any hostile act and does not attempt to
escape. 1977 PROTOCOL I, art. 41(2), supra note 4.
127. PETERS, supra note 42, at 27.
128. 1973 ICRC REPORT, supra note 3, at 13.
129. Robert Bunker succinctly and graphically described this paradox: "it is
more acceptable for a high-velocity round form a modem assault rifle to shatter
the skull of an opposing soldier and kill him via massive cerebral trauma than to
use a low-powered laser that blinds him as a by-product of counteroptical fire."
Robert Bunker, U.S. Must Seize the Future With Tactical Laser Development,
DEFENSE NEWS, Sept. 3, 1995, at 15.
130. The 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration stated that:
Considering the progress of civilization should have the effect
of alleviating as much as possible, the calamities of war:
That the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to
accomplish during war is to weaken the military force of the
enemy;
That for this purpose, it is sufficient to disable the greatest
possible number of men;
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or
render their death inevitable;
That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be
contrary to the laws of humanity.
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international military commission declared a prohibition on the use
of explosive projectiles weighing less than four hundred grams.
132
The military commission determined that the explosive bullets were
capable of rendering only one man hors de combatat a time; the
same as a non-explosive bullet was capable.'33 Since a non-
explosive bullet would alone be sufficient to render a combatant
hors de combat, the explosive bullet served only to uselessly
aggravate the injury.
In banning the munition, the commission declared that they
had "fixed by a common accord the technical limits within which
the necessities of war ought to yield to the demands of humani-
ty.""' 4 Although now a principle of customary international law,
application of the prohibition against unnecessary suffering -has
proven to be difficult due to its vagueness. 35
b. The 1899 Hague Convention.-In 1899, an interna-
tional conference was once again convened with a focus on
prohibiting or limiting the use of certain weapons.'36 Concerned
that the economic cost of preparing for war might eventually lead
to war, the Russian Foreign Minister wrote, "if this state of affairs
be prolonged, it will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it
is designed to avert, and the impending horrors of which are fearful
St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 93.
131. Representatives from sixteen states (Austria-Hungary, Bavaria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia and
the North German Confederation, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland,
Turkey, and Wurtemberg) met for three sessions in November of 1868, with the
treaty being formally signed on Dec. 11, 1868. ADAM ROBERTS & RICHARD
GUELFF, DOcUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 29, 32 (2d ed. 1989).
132. The munition banned by the Declaration was a small calibre explosive
bullet originally designed to be used against material, but when modified to
explode upon contact with soft material such as human flesh, was found to be
effective against combatants as well. MCCOUBREY, supra note 96, at 155.
However, the view has also been expressed that the munition had little relevance
to modem warfare in the first place. STONE, supra note 119, at 552.
133. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 13.
134. St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 93. The commission also realized
that future limitations on weapons would be necessary "in view of future
improvements which science may effect in the armament of troops." Id.
135. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 30. Apart from instances of express
limitations on weapons, States will not easily limit the use of a weapon once it has
been incorporated into their arsenal under the principle prohibiting unnecessary
suffering. Id.
136. The Conference was convened through the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II
of Russia, with representatives from twenty-six states meeting in the Hague from
May 18 to July 29, 1899. ROBERTS & GuELFF, supra note 131, at 35.
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to every human thought." '137 The First Hague Peace Conference
declared limitations on three types of weapons'38 and adopted a
Convention With Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, with Annexed Regulations.139 The 1899 Hague Convention
II was the first successful codification of comprehensive internation-
al laws of war.'" The origins of the 1899 Hague Convention II
can be found in the 1874 Declaration of Brussels,141 the Lieber
Code, and the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg. Stating in the
preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention II that its provisions were
"inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war so far as
military necessities permit," the Convention continues in the
tradition of the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. 42 Representa-
tives at the Hague were cognizant of the imperative nature of the
principle of proportionality, (i.e., the balancing of military necessity
against the requirements of humanity). 43
The 1899 Hague Declaration 31' provided a direct prohibi-
tion against the use of 'dum dum' bullets, 45 which were defined
as "bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body.""
This type of bullet would expand upon impact, causing much more
damage upon entering the flesh than an ordinary bullet. Once
again, it was no more effective than regular bullets at rendering
combatants hors de combat. It instead served only to uselessly
137. MCCOuBREY, supra note 96, at 155, 6.
138. The 1899 Hague Peace Conference expressly provided in three declara-
tions, prohibitions on: (1) the launching of projectiles and explosives from
balloons; (2) projectiles diffusing asphyxiating gases; and, (3) the use of expanding
bullets. MCCOUBREY, supra note 96, at 156.
139. 1899 Hague Convention II, supra note 105.
140. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 131, at 43. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5,
at 14.
141. Although the 1874 Brussels Declaration represented a comprehensive
declaration on the laws of war which pre-dated the 1899 Hague Convention II, it
was never ratified and never entered into force. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note
131, at 43. "The laws of war do not allow to belligerents an unlimited power as
to the choice of means of injuring the enemy." Declaration of Brussels
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War (1874), art. XII, in FRIEDMAN, supra
note 1, at 194.
142. 1899 Hague Convention II, Preamble, supra note 105.
143. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 15.
144. Declaration 3 represents a direct application of the prohibition against
unnecessary suffering found in the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration. KALSHOVEN,
supra note 5, at 30.
145. The name was derived from the British Indian arsenal of Dum-Dum, near
Calcutta, where the munition was first manufactured. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra
note 133, at 39.
146. MCCOUBREY, supra note 96, at 156.
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aggravate injuries and cause unnecessary suffering; unnecessary in
the sense that the injury inflicted is far greater than that necessary
for a combatant to be rendered hors de combat.147
c. The 1907 Hague Convention.-A second Hague
conference was convened in 1907 in order to consider matters
unresolved by the first conference." The 1907 Hague Conven-
tion IV replaced the 1899 Hague Convention II, with only minor
revisions. Article 23(e) states that in addition to specific prohibi-
tions on weapons it is "especially forbidden ... [t]o employ arms,
projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffer-
ing."' 49  Not only did the 1907 Hague Convention IV address
limitations on means, but it also placed express limitations on some
methods of warfare as well. 5'
Recognizing the inherent inability of the 1907 Hague Conven-
tion IV to regulate entirely the conduct of war,151 the preamble
contains an extremely important clause which serves to cover
unforeseen situations.52 This clause serves to protect combatants
in circumstances not previously expressly regulated, by providing
that the conduct of war will always implicitly be governed by
existing principles of customary international law. 53 Through
widespread acceptance, the principles and rules embodied in the
147. In other words, the suffering is not justified by the military utility and
therefore unnecessary. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 29.
148. ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra note 131, at 43. This need for a second
conference was foreseen and provided for in the Final Act of the First Hague
Peace Conference of 1899. Id.
149. Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.
18, 1907, art. 23(e), 36 Stat. 2277, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 3eme) 461-503
[hereinafter 1907 Hague Convention IV]. In addition, Convention IV confirmed
that the "right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited." Id. at art. 22.
150. Id. at art. 23(a), art. 23(b), art. 28.
151. The preamble to the 1907 Hague Convention states that it has not "been
found possible at present to concert regulations covering all the circumstances
which arise in practice." kL
152. The Martens Clause, named for its author the Russian Delegate to the
conference, appears in the preamble and states that in situations not covered by
the regulations "the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection
and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates
of the public conscience." Id. at Preamble.
153. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 14.
BLINDING LASER WEAPONS
Hague Regulations have themselves become recognized as
customary international law."M
d. Unnecessary suffering and the laser weapon.-The
conduct of modern warfare and the medical care available are such
that an estimated fifty percent of wounded combatants can expect
to return to duty within fifty days."55 Fully, sixty percent of those
combatants rendered hors de combat by a conventional weapon
experience total recovery from their injuries. 6 The blinding
effects of a laser, however, render a combatant hors de combat for
not only the duration of the conflict, but for life.
Vision accounts for ninety percent or more of our sensory
input and there are no prosthetic devices available to replace
sight. 7 Loss of sight is destructive to the individual's self-im-
age.5 Perceptual and motor skills, mobility, and communication
are all impaired. They can only be improved through extensive re-
education and rehabilitation.5 9 Instantaneous loss of sight would
be a traumatic experience, especially for a young soldier. Blinding
lasers would cause just that unnecessary suffering which is prohibit-
ed by customary international law.
It is relevant to look at the social, as well as the psychological,
damage caused by the use of lasers to blind."6 Interviews of
soldiers revealed that the fear of mutilation by injury is greater
than the fear of death. Additionally, of all the possible injuries,
blindness is feared the most.16' This deep-seated fear of blindness
could contribute to increases in the number of combatants
returning home with post-traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter
PTSD).'" Blindness carries with it profound consequences for
the victim and society."6 The possibility of large numbers of
incapacitated soldiers'" returning home from combat,"a depen-
154. This recognition occurred by the second World War and continues today.
Id at 18.
155. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 183.
156. Id. at 335.
157. Id. at 47.
158. Id. at 204.
159. Id at 183.
160. PETERS, supra note 42, at 25.
161. DoSwALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 288.
162. Id. at 287. Since the development of PTSD appears dependent on the
duration of the stress experience, if the combatant is blinded while already
suffering from an anxiety (such as the fear of being blinded by a laser) he is more
likely to develop PTSD. Id.
163. Id. at 258.
164. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 212.
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dent on others for support, would put a tremendous strain on both
private and public resources.166 The total impact of attempting
to reintegrate soldiers blinded by lasers back into society would be
burdensome and prolonged. 67
IV. The 1980 Weapons Conference and Protocol IV
Although limitations on weapons had long been recognized as
being within the purview of the law of the Hague, the 1980
Weapons Convention is an amalgamation of customary internation-
al law,"6 the law of Geneva, and the efforts of both the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (hereinafter ICRC) and the
United Nations.6 9
A. The 1980 Weapons Convention
The Ad Hoc Committee on Conventional Weapons 70
addressed the issue of limitations on specific conventional weapons
in four separate sessions convened in Geneva from 1974 to 1977,
but came to no formal resolution on the matter.17' The ICRC
made conventional weapons a focus at the ICRC Conference of
Government Experts on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
as well, which met originally in Lucerne in 1974, and the follow-up
conference in Lugano in 1976.172 In 1977, the United Nations
165. Eye injuries requiring medical treatment could account for between
twenty-five and fifty percent of all battlefield wounds if large numbers of anti-
personnel lasers were deployed, whereas without any laser weapons deployed, the
expected percentage of eye injuries would only be six to nine percent of all
injuries. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 315-16.
166. Id. at 50. There would be a tremendous demand placed upon rehabilita-
tion, vocational, and personal counseling resources. Id.
167. Id. at 51.
168. The preamble states that the Weapons Convention is based in part "on the
principle of international law that the right of the parties to an armed conflict to
choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and on the principle that
prohibits the employment in armed conflicts of weapons, projectiles and material
and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury of unnecessary
suffering." Weapons Convention, Appendix A, supra note 6.
169. ROBERTS & GuELFF, supra note 131, at 471.
170. The committee was part of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirma-
tion and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed
Conflicts. Id. at 471.
171. Id. In 1977, the Geneva Conference adopted resolution 22(IV) which
recommended the convening of a separate conference no later than 1979, for the
purpose of prohibiting or restricting the use of certain conventional weapons. Id.
172. DELUPIS, supra note 115, at 181.
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resolved that a UN conference concerning conventional weapons
would be convened in 1979.173
Preparatory sessions were held in Geneva and were attended
by representatives of eighty-five states.174  On September 10,
1979, the first session of the Weapons Conference17 was con-
vened in Geneva and attended by representatives from eighty-two
states.176 Following the second session, the Convention and the
three additional protocols were adopted by the Conference on
October 10, 1980, and entered into force on December 2, 1983.1'7
The actual prohibitions or restrictions on weapons appear in
the individual protocols and not in the text of the Convention. It
was not certain whether States would agree to all the prohibitions
or restrictions and it was, therefore, decided to put them in three
separate protocols.78 In order for a State to become a Party to
the Convention, it must only "consent to be bound by any two or
more of these Protocols.,
179
The United States was not a State Party to the Conven-
tion."8 Realizing that States not parties to the Convention would
only be invited as observers to the 1995 Review Conference,181
and that even when a State ratifies the Convention it only becomes
a State Party six months later,1" the Senate finally ratified the
Convention in March of 1995.183
173. United Nations Resolution 32/152 (1977). See ROBERTS & GUELFF, supra
note 131, at 471.
174. Id.
175. The United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restriction of Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. Weapons Convention, supra note 6.
176. The second session was convened on Sept. 15, 1980 and was attended by
representatives of seventy-six states. Id.
177. Id.
178. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 149.
179. Weapons Convention, supra note 6.
180. Id. The United States encouraged other States to ratify the Convention
and its Protocols, but neither the Reagan nor the Bush administrations submitted
it to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. Global Landmine Crisis:
United States Senate Appropriations/Foreign Operations FY 95 Foreign Operations
Appropriation FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE, May 13,1994, (statement
of Cyrus R. Vance, Former Secretary of State).
181. Weapons Convention, art. 8, para. 3(a), supra note 6.
182. Id. at art. 5, para. 2.
183. Department of State Dispatch, Non-proliferation Priorities for 1995, Mar.
13, 1995, Vol. 06 No. 11.
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B. Protocol IV
At the Review Conference, delegates had a draft protocol
proposed by Sweden with which to work."8 The protocol that
emerged eventually from the Review Conference is one of guarded
language and compromise. It is, however, parallel in language and
effect to the official United States policy on blinding lasers. 85
Protocol IV will be annexed to the Weapons Convention if ratified
by twenty states,186 and will enter into force six months after
annexation."8
1. Protocol IV in Brief-Article 1 sets forth the class of laser
weapon that is to be banned by the protocol. It states that it is
prohibited to "employ laser weapons specifically designed, as their
sole combat function or as one of their combat functions, to cause
permanent blindness to unenhanced vision."'" Only those laser
weapons designed, either as a primary or secondary function, to
blind are proscribed. Article 1 also provides for a ban on the
transfer of such weapons to any State or non-State entity by a High
Contracting Party."9
184. PETERS, supra note 42, at 33. The draft protocol emerged from meetings
of the Group of Governmental Experts while preparing amendments to the
Weapons Convention, and stated (with alternative wording in brackets):
Article 1
It is prohibited to employ laser beams of a nature to cause
permanent blindness [serious damage] against the eyesight of
persons as a method of warfare.
Article 2
It is prohibited to [produce and] employ laser weapons primarily
designed to blind [permanently].
Article 3
Blinding as an incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate
employment of laser beams on the battlefield is not covered by this
prohibition.
Id.
185. Department of Defense News Release, supra note 122. Secretary of
Defense William Perry announced the new policy as prohibiting the use of lasers
"specifically designed to cause permanent blindness," but went no further because
of the vital nature of lasers to the military. Id.
186. Weapons Convention, art. 8, para. 2(b), supra note 6. Additional protocols
"shall be adopted in the same manner as this Convention" and "shall be annexed
thereto." Id.
187. Id. at art. 5, para. 3. A protocol annexed to the Convention "shall enter
into force six months after the date by which twenty states have notified their
consent to be bound by it." Id.
188. PROTOCOL IV, art. 1, supra note 6.
189. Id.
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Article 2 provides that when employing any laser system, the
High Contracting Parties "shall take all feasible precautions to
avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced
vision.' " The necessary precautionary measures for the High
Contracting Parties must take are to include "training of their
armed forces and other practical measures.
191
Article 3 is a corollary to Article 1 and provides some
definition concerning what laser systems are not to be considered
as designed, as either a primary or secondary purpose, to cause
permanent blindness. It does this by stating that blinding "as an
incidental or collateral effect of the legitimate military employment
of laser systems, including laser systems used against optical
equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol.
192
Anti-sensor laser weapons are therefore, not prohibited, so long as
legitimately employed.
Article 4 defines permanent blindness for purposes of the
protocol as "irreversible and uncorrectable loss of vision which is
seriously disabling with no prospect of recovery."'1 93 It goes on
to define serious disability as "equivalent to visual acuity of less
than 20/200 Snellen measured using both eyes.
194
2. Deficiencies of Protocol IV-Protocol IV is a positive
attempt to prevent the use of inhumane laser weapons before their
mass introduction onto the battlefields of tomorrow.95 It is a
progressive limitation on a weapon that has not yet been intro-
duced, but whose humanitarian consequences have been realized
and deemed disproportionate to its potential military benefit.1 96
Like the other three protocols annexed to the Weapons Conven-
tion, the final draft of Protocol IV was shaped by the forces of
compromise."9 Instead of seizing the opportunity to comprehen-
190. Id. at art. 2.
191. Id.
192. Protocol IV, art. 3, supra note 6 (emphasis mine).
193. Id. at art. 4.
194. Id.
195. In this respect it is similar to the 1899 Hague Convention banning the use
of Asphyxiating Gases and the 1925 Prohibition against bacteriological warfare.
PICTET, supra note 94, at 55.
196. Julius Stone writes that States in general "only come to a common view
on regulating or prohibiting new weapons after the potentialities of those weapons
are fully explored, and when no one of them can rely on obtaining or maintaining
the lead in their use." STONE, supra note 119, at 551.
197. The positions of States prior to the Convention were often times quite far
apart, and the eventual protocols which emerged reflect the necessary compromis-
es. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 147.
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sively ban the use of lasers to blind as a method of warfare;198 to
institute regulation and enforcement measures; and to protect
combatants from the threat of permanent blindness; the delegates
instead compromised.
a. Limits means not methods.-In marked departure
from article 1 of the proposed draft protocol, there is no language
in Protocol IV providing that blinding as a method of warfare is
prohibited.' It was the intention of the draft protocol that a
prohibition on the method, not just the means, would "establish the
international norm that common and systematic use of lasers to
blind is unacceptable and unlawful."2" Apart from the customary
international law provisions in the Preamble to the Weapons
Convention, 1 there is no overarching policy governing the use
of lasers to blind.
Prior to the 1995 Weapons Convention Review Conference,
the need for a provision prohibiting blinding as a method of
warfare was recognized by various individuals and nongovernmen-
tal organizations as paramount. In a July 31, 1995, letter to
Defense Secretary William Perry, forty-eight United States
legislators requested that he "actively support efforts to seek an
international prohibition on the use of lasers for the purpose of
blinding as a method of warfare."'  The Human Rights Watch
Arms Project organization2 3 had stressed that language prohibit-
ing blinding as a method of warfare, was the most important part
of the draft protocol.' Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and
Representative Lane Evans (D-IL) stated in a letter to Secretary
of State Warren Christopher, that without a clear policy supporting
198. Methods of warfare has been defined as tactics or other deliberate and
systematic actions intended to harm or neutralize the enemy. PETERS, supra note
42, at 35.
199. Focusing on the methods of warfare would necessarily include an explicit
ban on the "deliberate and systematic antipersonnel use of any kind of lasers that
would cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering." ANDERBEkG &
WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 213.
200. PETERS, supra note 42, at 33.
201. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
202. PETERS, supra note 42, at 44.
203. Human Rights Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in
1978 to monitor and promote the observance of internationally recognized human
rights. PETERS, supra note 42, at 49. The Arms Project was established in 1992
to monitor and prevent arms transfers to governments or organizations grossly
violating internationally recognized human rights and the laws of war, and to
promote freedom of information regarding arms transfers worldwide. Id.
204. PETERS, supra note 42, at 33.
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an international prohibition on the use of lasers to blind as a
method of warfare, it was their belief that "an effective internation-
al protocol to achieve this goal will be difficult, if not impossible to
achieve." 5  In spite of these efforts, the proposed prohibition
against blinding as a method of warfare was left out of the final
draft.'
The United States, among other countries, had been fearful
that a general prohibition against the use of lasers to blind would
open combatants to charges of engaging in war crimes for acciden-
tal blinding by laser systems. 7 This fear was unfounded since a
prohibition against blinding as a method of warfare would "ban the
use of all practices that deliberately cause blindness;" but it would
also implicitly "protect personnel who use such non-weapon laser
systems as laser rangefinders and target designators that can cause
blindness incidentally or accidentally."2'
Without a general policy prohibiting deliberate blinding as a
method of warfare, the scope of the protocol and its effectiveness
are greatly reduced. Under international law, a specific weapon is
not considered banned unless there is a treaty addressing the use
of that specific weapon.' All present and future weapons with
the potential to blind are not prohibited by Protocol IV unless they
are designed specifically to blind. Unless there is a specific
prohibition in a future international treaty, they will continue to
avoid prohibition. If there had been a broader, more inclusive
prohibition against blinding as a method of warfare in Protocol IV,
then present and future laser systems would be evaluated by how
they are actually used during a conflict, not by their designer's
intended function. If a laser weapon's function is not primarily to
blind combatants, then its use is permissible under Protocol IV with
no future judgment to be made upon the weapon, even if its later
use were found to be anti-personnel.
b. No objective standard.-Without some objective
standard for determining whether a laser system is specifically
designed to blind as a combat function, the distinction drawn in the
205. Letter from Senator Leahy and Representative Evans to Secretary of State
Warren Christopher (Sept. 14, 1995), in PETERS, supra note 42, at 41.
206. PROTOCOL IV, supra note 6.
207. Pentagon Cancels Controversial Laser, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1995, at A16.
208. PETERS, supra note 42, at 33.
209. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 212.
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Protocol becomes virtually meaningless.21 The United States has
stated that it "does not possess, nor is it developing, laser weapons
designed or intended primarily to permanently blind enemy
combatants., 211  Intentions and realities often differ and, for
precisely this reason Human Rights Watch favors language
prohibiting laser weapons that "have blinding as a primary effect"
over a prohibition against laser weapons specifically designed to
blind.2 2
It is possible to arrive at an objective standard for determining
what laser systems are designed to blind. It must be remembered
that it is always the target in question which determines the
qualities of the laser to be employed.213 In light of this fact, there
are necessary parameters which serve to constrain the options for
producing effective anti-personnel laser systems. 214 The designer
of an effective low energy laser weapon must carefully select a laser
with certain desired properties in order to produce a weapon that
will be as effective as possible. 5 The ICRC has developed what
can be considered the technical specifications for the ideal
characteristics of an effective anti-personnel system.216  While
recognizing that proscribing laser weapons with certain technical
specifications could encourage avoiding compliance by simply
employing lasers with different specifications, there must also be
recognition of the necessity of some guidelines in determining
which laser weapons are designed to intentionally blind.
210. In a resolution supporting a protocol on blinding laser weapons, the
European Parliament supported language prohibiting the use of laser weapons that
"can cause" blindness. PETERS, supra note 42, at 33.
211. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense Holmes to Representative
Evans and Senator Leahy (Mar. 27, 1995), in PETERS, supra note 42, at 5, n.13.
212. PETERS, supra note 42, at 34. A ban on lasers based on design or function
would "justify use of tactical laser weapons on the grounds that they are not
primarily designed to blind... but that they are designed primarily... to disrupt
electro-optical and optical instruments," with blinding as an incidental or collateral
effect. Id.
213. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 93.
214. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 129.
215. ANDERBERG & WOLBARSHT, supra note 8, at 150.
216. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 133. A suitable specification might be:
wavelength: invisible, between 800 and 1400nm
pulse duration: around 1 ns
energy per pulse: 1 J
beam divergence: 0.25 mrad
repetition rate: between 20 and 200 Hz.
BLINDING LASER WEAPONS
some objective standard for determining what laser weapons are
intended as anti-personnel, article 3 presents a tremendous
loophole for those desirous of skirting the prohibitions of the
protocol. Except for blatant cases, such as the Chinese ZM-87,
where the laser weapon is promoted as being capable of blinding,
dual purpose laser weapons with the potential for anti-personnel
use will not be covered by the prohibition. This is due to the
inherent difficulty of attempting to "distinguish between a laser
designed to blind and other lasers intended for alternate purpos-
es."2
17
Any laser weapon employing an optical device which does not
provide for a physical separation from the eye, such as a television
screen, when used it against a combatant will in fact be targeting
the eye since the laser will blind the combatant before it destroys
the optical device.218 Even in the case of electro-optical devices,
the laser would normally only temporarily jam the device, in the
same way that bright headlights on a car would affect a driver's
vision, forcing the combatant to switch to an optical device where
the eyes would be unprotected.2 19
An anti-sensor weapon such as. the Stingray scans the battle-
field and detects laser pulses reflected back by optical devices.
There is no way for the weapon to distinguish between an electro-
optical device and an optical device that a combatant is looking
through before it then fires a stronger laser pulse at the optical
device in order to overwhelm and destroy it.2' Once again, the
eye would be damaged before the optical device.
d. Lack of enforcement provisions. -Unlike other
codified agreements of international law, the Weapons Convention
contains no provisions for implementation and enforcement.22
The only thing that it does require is that state parties undertake
to disseminate the Convention and its annexed Protocols as widely
217. Graham, supra note 81, at A3. The United States has stated that it "does
not possess, nor is it developing, laser weapons designed or intended primarily to
permanently blind enemy combatants." ARKIN, supra note 53, at 5.
218. Steve Pagani, U.N. Conference Urged to Ban Blinding Lasers, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Oct. 4, 1995.
219. William M. Arkin, The Pentagon's Blind Ambition, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
1995, at A23.
220. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 12, at 108. Distinguishing between an optical
and an electro-optical device would be impossible because the reflection from the
optical lens would appear like that from an electro-optical sensor. Id.
221. KALSHOVEN, supra note 5, at 152.
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as possible in their countries and their armed forces.22 In con-
trast, the 1977 Geneva Protocol I contains numerous provisions
defining what actions constitute grave breaches under the proto-
col,' the consequences to superiors and commanders for failing
to repress such breaches, 24 the necessity of mutual assistance in
criminal proceedings,' and the formation of international fact-
finding commissions for investigating alleged breaches. 22 There
are no such provisions to be found anywhere in the Weapons
Convention. The Human Rights Watch Arms Project recognized
this deficiency as resulting in the failure to implement the substan-
tive provisions of Protocol II to the Weapons Convention and
emphasized the necessity of incorporating a verification and
enforcement scheme into Protocol IV.227 Proposed verification
provisions were a major stumbling block to delegates at the Review
Conference in failing to amend Protocol II.21 Without any
verification or enforcement mechanisms, Protocol IV is toothless
and cannot significantly affect the development, production, and
use of laser weapons that blind.
V. Conclusion
Protocol IV is a positive attempt at prohibiting a weapon
whose military utility is far outweighed by its grave humanitarian
consequences. Blinding lasers are violative of both customary and
codified international laws of armed conflict. Although certain
classes of laser weapons escape express prohibition, they still are
violative of the spirit of the humanitarian law of armed conflict. It
must be remembered that the Martens Clause always provides
humanitarian protection for combatants, for the principles of
customary international law are always applicable to the means and
methods of warfare. Protocol IV is a positive first step but far
from being a final step.
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